

Religion and the gender vote gap: women's changed political preferences from the 1970s to 2010

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
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Philip Manow
Patrick Emmenegger

Religion and the gender vote gap

Women's changed
political preferences
from the 1970s to 2010

ZeS-Working Paper No. 01/2012





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WORKING PAPERS

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For many years women tended to vote more conservative than men (the 'old' gender vote gap), but since the 1980s this gap in many countries has shifted direction: now women in many countries are more likely to support left parties than men of the same age, in the same income bracket, and at the same educational level (the 'new' gender vote gap). The literature largely agrees on a set of political-economic factors explaining the change in women's political orientation: changed employment patterns, women's higher educational achievements, and higher divorce rates. These trends turned women into supporters of generous social programs that promise to 'de-familialize' services formerly provided privately within the family. In this paper, we demonstrate that these conventional political-economic factors fall short in explaining the old gender vote gap. We may therefore also harbor doubts whether they provide us with a full story for the new gender vote gap. Instead, we highlight the importance of religion for the gendered pattern of voting behavior that we observe. We argue that where vote choice expressed preferences on a non-economic, i.e. mainly religious issue dimension, parties in the past could afford – at least to some extent – ignoring voters' socio-economic interests. Given that surveys show us a constantly higher degree of religiosity among women and a relatively persistent and strong impact of religion on vote choice, religion can indeed, we argue, explain a substantial part of the old and new gender vote gap.

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Introduction

For many years women tended to vote more conservative than men (the “old” gender vote gap), but since the 1980s this has changed: women in many countries are now more likely to support left parties than men of the same age, same income bracket, and same educational level (the “new” gender vote gap; cf. Ingelhart and Norris 2000; Giger 2009). The literature has offered several explanations for this robust finding, but largely agrees on a set of determinants to explain the change in women’s political orientation: changed employment patterns, women’s higher educational achievements, higher divorce rates and consequently more lone mothers. These trends turned women into supporters of generous social programs that promise to “de-familialize” services formerly provided privately within the family, i.e. overwhelmingly by women (Esping-Andersen 2009). De-familialization of family care makes it easier for women to find employment in the private service sector or in the welfare state itself, if the welfare state offers women enhanced employment chances in public social services (Huber and Stephens 2000). This explanation generates both a temporal prediction: over time, the new gender vote gap should widen, and a comparative prediction: the new gender vote gap should vary with female labor force participation and divorce rates (cf. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010). This could account for the fact that in some countries (Scandinavia, North America) women developed pro-

welfare state preferences, i.e. voted left, much earlier than in other countries (e.g. Southern Europe).

Although the empirical evidence by and large matches these expectations, we think that this account leaves a couple of important questions unresolved, most importantly: Why did women’s and men’s voting behavior in the 1950s and 1960s differ (the old gender gap)? Female labor force participation and divorce rates were still low, political preferences should have predominantly been formed at the household level and therefore supposedly should have been fully harmonious between the sexes. Since the conventional political-economic factors apparently fall short in explaining the old differences in political preferences among the sexes, we also doubt whether they fully explain the new. In this paper we highlight the importance of religion for the gendered pattern of voting behavior that we observe. We argue that where vote choice expressed preferences on a non-economic, i.e. mainly religious issue-dimension (De La O and Rodden 2008), parties in the past could afford – at least to some extent – ignoring voters’ socio-economic interests. Given that surveys show us a constantly higher degree of religiosity among women and a relatively persistent and strong impact of religion on vote choice (Dalton 1996; Brooks et al. 2006), religion can indeed, we argue, explain a substantial part of the old and new gender vote gap.

Importantly, our argument pertains

not only to religious determinants of the individual vote choice, but also to the competitive constellation among parties. We contend that in countries with a strong confessional cleavage, party competition over the religious, i.e. over-proportionately female vote was distorted. Given that devout Catholics could not credibly threaten to switch to a left party given those parties' pronounced, often aggressive anti-clericalism, Christian democratic parties could for a long time count on loyal voters with a socio-economic background who otherwise, in the absence of the confessional cleavage, would have opted for a different party with a more redistributive platform. Elsewhere, the inter-party competition for the female vote was not religiously contorted, and therefore left and right parties' programmatic adjustment to the changed employment and family patterns happened much earlier.

In the following we show that (1) religiosity remains a strong and independent factor in vote choice in Western democracies (although the share of religious voters has decreased over time), that (2) gender differences in religiosity accounted for much of the old gender differences in voting behavior, i.e. that gender differences in voting substantially decrease once we control for religiosity. We demonstrate that religious voting is more pronounced in party systems with a strong pro-/anti-clerical cleavage (3). And we show that (4) the gender vote gap is almost fully explained with controls for employment, marital status, and religiosity.

We also point to one intervening factor which up to now has been rather neglected in the literature: although women

may develop an interest in more generous child care provision, all-day schooling, and other welfare programs that "de-familialize" services initially provided privately, these political preferences often, but not necessarily, translate into a vote for a left party. This is because women's interests in easy labor market entry may also translate into preferences for less employment protection, lower minimum wages, and higher labor market flexibility – given that high minimum wages crowd out private services (like private child care) and given that high employment protection discriminates against women with their higher probability of career interruption (Estevez-Abe 2006). But these "outsider" interests in less regulation have clearly not been served by traditional left parties (Rueda 2005). We therefore need to control for labor market context if we want to identify the determinants of the female vote choice: where the provision of public social services by a generous welfare state is a likely option, women might increasingly vote for social democratic parties (Huber and Stephens 2000; Iversen and Wren 1998), but where this is not a realistic option, it might be in their interest to vote for a party that promises to deregulate labor markets.

Our argument contributes to the literature in several respects: we offer a consistent explanation for the alignment and re-alignment of the female vote. In accordance with a larger voting literature (cf. Dalton 1996; Brooks et al. 2006), we stress the enduring importance of non-economic factors, in particular the impact of religion on vote choices. We emphasize that this also means that women's political

preferences in conservative welfare states or Catholic countries cannot exclusively be explained with rational calculations based on socio-economic interests (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006, 2010). Thereby our argument also helps explain a paradox of the comparative welfare state literature, namely that women in Continental and Southern Europe tended to vote for parties that were particularly unresponsive to their socio-economic interests (Lewis 1992; Sainsbury 1994; Sainsbury 1996; O'Connor et al. 1999). Our main explanation points to the distorted electoral competition for the religious vote in countries with a strong confessional cleavage. Moreover, we demonstrate the context sensitivity of women's vote choice. Where the generous provision of social services by the welfare state was not a feasible option (Iversen and Wren 1998), women's interest in less regulated labor markets often made them opt for the political right. We thereby demonstrate the relevance of the service economy trilemma for the new gender vote gap in Western European countries since the 1970s.

The paper proceeds as follows: After a brief summary of the literature, we develop our own hypotheses, describe our data and report our empirical findings and finally conclude.

Explaining the Gender Vote Gap: the Literature

The literature on electoral behavior in the first three postwar decades finds a persistent pattern of “female conservatism” – women are more likely than men with the same socio-economic characteristics to vote for conservative parties (Norris 1987). These gender differences in voting behavior were often not very large and varied across countries, but they existed and persisted. However, this old gender vote gap seemed to have dissolved by the late 1970s and early 1980s. With the United States as a forerunner and the Scandinavian countries close behind, students of electoral behavior observed first women’s political de-alignment and subsequently their re-alignment: not only did the old gender vote gap disappear in many countries, a new one appeared in its stead, with women now being more likely to vote left than men of the same age, income and educational level (Studlar et al. 1998; Inglehart and Norris 2000: 450, Figure 3).

The literature has explained the traditional gender differences in political preferences and behavior with women’s lower degree of labor market participation and longer life expectancy. The literature also refers to women’s educational role in the family and the corresponding stronger emphasis on moral and value issues as the cause of political preferences and of a voting behavior that seems to be less well predicted with socio-economic status (cf. Jelen et al. 1994). The new gender vote gap then could – to a large extent, so it seemed – be consistently explained with

changes in the determinants of the old one: with higher female labor force participation, higher divorce rates, and more generally with changed family patterns and encompassing value change. With a higher chance of being or becoming economically independent of the male partner’s income and his labor market fate, with a higher chance of own labor force participation, with higher educational attainment, women’s voting decisions should more and more mirror their distinct economic policy preferences. Women’s changed economic role went hand in hand with a broader value change, a stronger emphasis on self-expression, equal opportunity, the erosion of traditional gender roles, more liberal views on the family and sexual mores. According to the “developmental” theory of the old and new gender vote gap structural and cultural changes – mutually reinforcing each other – both contributed to women’s political de- and re-alignment (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart 1997).

Behind these explanations lies an argument in which a lesser degree of labor market participation or generally of economic involvement allows non-economic considerations to more forcefully enter the individual voting decision. Jelen et al. (1994: 171) summarize this position as follows: “relatively sheltered lives led by most women in much of the West in earlier decades ... rendered women relatively pure carriers of a culture’s tradi-

tions. (...) as women increasingly enter the paid labour force, these traditional differences are likely to be reduced or eliminated." More recent studies on the impact of religion on political preferences are compatible with this argument (cf. De la O and Rodden 2008; Finseraas 2010). A second, "moral" issue dimension explains deviations from purely economic, interest-driven voting because it forces voters to choose between their moral and economic preferences. Race or religion in the context of US politics or religion in the context of European politics can be such a second dimension, which splits the class vote and thereby weakens the support of the left. The saliency of the two dimensions may differ among societal groups. For instance, De la O and Rodden (2008: 440) show that the relationship between church attendance and voting for non-left parties is mainly driven by low income voters. In contrast, high income voters seem to more closely follow their economic preferences. In a variation of this argument, Roemer (1997, 2001) explains deviations from economic voting with "issue bundling". Political parties adopt positions on several issue dimensions. Voters then choose among these issue bundles offered. Given a limited number of parties, poor religious voters might be forced to choose between a pro-redistribution, anti-clerical and an anti-redistribution, pro-clerical party. For strongly religious voters, the anti-clerical party might not be an option.

Other explanations for the observed gender differences have been put forward. Some hold that spirituality and protection against existential threats are sub-

stitutes for each other, so that religious persons demand less social protection than non-religious people, also because they in situations of need can count on local support networks (Gill 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2004; Scheve and Stasavage 2006). An alternative argument holds that traditionally the gender division of labor had aligned women's political preferences with that of their male partners (cf. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010, 2006).¹ Given that women have natural advantages in caring for very young children, families in the past tended towards an "efficient" division of labor: men are in formal employment, women do the non-market family work (Becker 1981). But once divorce and/or female labor force participation become likely events, women start to care more about their labor market "outside options". Male and female economic and then also political preferences become distinct.

Women's new interests primarily concern the compatibility of work and family, easier labor market access, a (public) infrastructure for early child care and all-day schooling as well as for caring for the old and frail, own welfare entitle-

¹ One – less often discussed – implication would be that we may then observe not only gender differences in vote choices, but also in turnout. In fact, studies on electoral turnout have found persistent, if small differences between the sexes (Blais 2000; Franklin 2004), but usually do not discuss causes and consequences. Our argument stresses that religious voters are confronted with 'cross-pressures' – on a socioeconomic dimension they would like to vote for left parties, on a second dimension they cannot, since left parties are aggressively anti-clerical. Cross-pressure has been identified as a major determinant of abstention.

ments instead of those that are linked to the male's employment status, the reform of tax provisions that discriminate against female labor force participation etc. (Esping-Andersen 2009). The traditional gender division of labor – epitomized in the “male breadwinner” model – becomes contested, since women's household skills are only partially marketable and are developed at the cost of their marketable skills. With higher divorce rates, women therefore develop political preferences for welfare state policies that would ease their labor force participation (Manza and Brooks 1998).² Rosenbluth and Iversen (2010) see variations in values then as caused by the different degrees of women's inclusion into the labor market: “In countries where the demand for female labor is limited ... women are more likely than men to be socially conservative despite the unflattering roles their conservatism gives them to play. ... the reason is that women for whom the marriage market is the principal way to secure a livelihood seek to shore up the sanctity and strength of family values. Once committed to the life of a married woman, that marriage is the best that binds securely and for which obligations are taken seriously by the man as well as by the woman” (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010: 113).

These explanations leave us with a

² This is not necessarily the case, but rather dependent on whether the transition to a post-industrial society with high female employment in the service sector takes a ‘private’ or a ‘public’ route, i.e. whether much of the new social services are provided by the welfare state – as in Scandinavia – or through the market – as in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Scharpf 1997; Iversen and Wren 1998).

couple of open questions. Let us first take the “religious people demand less welfare”-argument. The reversed causality seems more plausible: where traditional religious voting loses its former strength, religious parties (= Christian Democracy) may want to keep their voters by appealing increasingly to their material interests. Social protection may be a substitute for religiosity, not because religious persons demand less social protection, but because religious parties supply more social protection once religious motives lose strength (Kersbergen and Manow 2009). This implies – put pointedly – that the welfare state does not cause secularization (Norris and Inglehart 2004), but is caused by secularization, i.e. a waning religiosity. As we know, Christian Democratic parties are not simply the transmission belt for the Catholic Church and its social doctrine, but they have used social policies to become independent from the church hierarchy (cf. Kalyvas 1996) and – we can add – more recently to become independent from exclusively religiously motivated voters, particularly in light of the fact that these voters are declining in numbers. This would also explain the “women unfriendliness” of the Christian Democratic welfare state: these parties could afford to neglect the interests of the groups who were most loyally attached to them.

Secondly, let us look at Iversen/Rosenbluth's argument about women's rational preferences for the male breadwinner model. Changing family patterns and work roles are common trends affecting all Western nations, but why has the demand for female labor been more limited in some countries and why was the tran-

sition towards a post-industrial and more gender-equal society slower in some countries than in others in the first place?³ We encounter the same problem when we consider divorce rates as an explanatory factor for recent changes in female voting behavior. Edlund and Pande (2002) found a nexus between a country's "divorce risk" and women's left voting – but again it is not clear whether higher divorce rates indicate a weakening of religious norms – a weakening which then would also set free a vote that previously had been "captured" by religious parties (i.e. Christian Democracy), or whether women – confronted with higher divorce rates – react rationally to the risk of income loss due to a family breakup by voting for left parties and their pro-welfare state programs. For labor force participation as well as for divorce rates, the rationalist/materialist account has a hard time explaining why in the past some countries female labor force participation was so much lower than elsewhere, if the old "male breadwinner" model was simply based on the small (and universal) differences between the sexes with respect to caring for very young children, or why the breakup of a marriage was less likely in some countries than in others. In this context it seems important to emphasize that a gender gap does not only emerge "when marriage contracting is incomplete and termination

of the contract is an ever-present possibility" (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010: 110), since – as we have seen – voting behavior also differed between the sexes in the old days of low divorce rates. This, we claim, points to the persisting independent causal impact of religion or religiosity on vote choices.

Once this independent causal impact is acknowledged, we can move beyond the ultimately unanswerable question whether Catholicism led to a very traditional, patriarchic gender division of labor which then contributed to female conservatism, or whether a low degree of women's integration into the labor market instilled conservative values among female voters. Our argument, which emphasizes the influence of the party system, posits that in countries with a strong pro-/anti-clericalism cleavage pious voters could not vote for left parties because of the latter's strong anti-clerical stance. One central prediction following from this is that the influence of religion on political preference formation and voting will not go away once we control for female labor force participation or for differences in marital status. Our empirical investigation will show that religiosity remains a strong if slowly weakening determinant of vote choices and political preferences even if we control for all relevant economic and familial factors. The higher degree of religiosity among women is a factor that consistently explains cross-country and temporal variance in the old and new gender vote gaps, with its consequences for redistribution, design of welfare state schemes, gender division of labor etc. Our main causal path, therefore, does not go

³ Part of the answer may lie in the gendered employment pattern of coordinated economies (Estevez-Abe 2006). But only part, since countries like Italy that do not rank high on any index of non-market coordination show the pattern of low female labor force participation, low divorce rates, a traditional male breadwinner model, and a conservative gender vote gap.

through the labor market, but through the party system.⁴ Our argument generates a series of hypotheses that will be tested in the following section:

(H1) Religiosity is a powerful independent predictor of the voting decision, in particular in countries characterized by a strong confessional cleavage.

(H2) The weaker the confessional cleavage in a country, the earlier the old gender vote gap disappears.

(H3) The old (new) gender vote gap becomes weaker (stronger) when we control for religiosity.

(H4) Non-married female respondents are more likely to vote for left and center-left parties. But since marital status is endogenous to religiosity, the effect of marital status is weaker than the effect of religiosity.

(H5) Labor market participation increases the likelihood of women voting for left and center-left parties if the country

is characterized by the public provision of social services. Again, since labor market participation is (partly) endogenous to religiosity, the effect of labor market participation is weaker than the effect of religiosity.

⁴ This distinguishes our argument from John Roemer's related argument (Roemer 1997, 2001). His model supposes two-party competition in two dimensions and therefore seems to fit the US case better. It emphasizes the incentives for a left party: Given that some religious poor voters do not vote for the left, a left party has to cater to a voter with a higher income than it would in the absence of this second dimension. We look at multi-party systems in which inter-party competition over a certain group of voters is severely distorted. We emphasize the incentives for the (center-) right party: Given that it can count on a group of loyal voters, it can neglect this group's material interests. Our model is rather informed by Europe's Christian Democratic party family and the welfare states it has contributed to set up in the postwar period. We would also like to highlight that a second moral issue dimension cannot be invoked by politicians at will – but either exists in a country or does not exist.

Empirical Analysis

Data and some descriptive findings

We use two data sources, the World Value Survey and the Eurobarometer Surveys. Eurobarometer is a biannual survey conducted in all EU member states with around 1,000 respondents per country. The 86 surveys from 1970 to 2002 have been integrated and standardized in the EB trendfile as provided by the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research with around 1.13 million observations. We have combined the trendfile with more recent Eurobarometer surveys to cover four full decades of socio-economic and cultural change from 1970 to 2010. The Eurobarometer surveys are a surprisingly underused data source. Besides a battery of EU-related questions, the surveys include a large number of standard questions relating to the respondent's demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal profile. Surveys ask respondents for their left-right self-placement, their vote intention, and whether they "feel close" to a particular party or are party members. This information can be combined with the additional basic demographic and socio-economic information on gender, income, age, education, marital status, and occupation. The Eurobarometer surveys also provide information on denomination, religiosity, work for charitable or religious organizations, and – of particular importance for our context – on church attendance. This exceptionally rich data set allows for a longitudinal study of the


changing political and religious affiliations of men and women, although such an endeavor is hindered by the fact that some basic categories have not been reported continuously.⁵

The World Value Survey is the largest cross-national survey on political attitudes. As of now, five waves are available. In the following analyses, we use waves 1 (early 1980s), 2 (early 1990s) and 4 (early 2000s) from the four-wave integrated data file produced by the WVS data archive. There are thus approximately ten years between each wave. The following ten countries are included in all three waves: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United States of America. The World Value Survey provides information on the party respondents would vote for, church attendance, labor market participation, marital status, and a range of control variables.

We start with some descriptive findings based on the long-term trends documented by four decades of Eurobarometer surveys. For presentational reasons, we first pick four prototypical countries: Italy as a classic Catholic country with a strong confessional cleavage line, with a conservative, "women-unfriendly" welfare

⁵ The church attendance question has been asked only rarely in Eurobarometers conducted after 1998, the vote intention question has unfortunately not been continued past 2000, and the household income question has been dropped in post-2002 surveys (see below).

Figure 1: Anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy scale in 1989



Note: Position of party leadership on the anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy scale based on an expert survey conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992). Only parties that had a vote share higher than five percent at the time of the expert survey (1989) are listed. Source of party vote share: Armingeon et al. (2010).

state and – paradoxically – a particularly strong conservative gender vote gap (Corbetta and Cavazza 2008); Germany as another conservative welfare state, although with somehow different labor market and social security institutions, but historically also with a strong conservative gender vote gap (Inglehart and Norris 2000: Table 1, 443); Denmark as an initially Protestant, today very secular society in which women early on shifted their allegiance to left parties in support of the generous Scandinavian welfare state policies; finally Great Britain as a country with an intermediate level of religiosity (and a dominant Anglican state church, therefore no strong confessional cleavage line), with a liberal-residual welfare state, in which women did not find employment in public (social) services, but mainly in private services (Scharpf 1997; Iversen and Wren 1998), where women's interests with re-

spect to the welfare state therefore were much more equivocal. Without employment in the public sector as a very likely option, female labor force participation rests on a flexible labor market both in the sense of allowing to substitute private family services via a cheap private service sector and of easing labor market entry by "outsiders" (Rueda 2005).⁶

Figure 1 displays the strength of the confessional cleavage in these four countries. Using the data by Laver and Hunt (1992) and for parties with a vote share higher than 5 percent at the time of the expert survey (1989), Figure 1 shows the

⁶ The EB surveys contain data for five more countries from the 1970s onwards. The analysis of Belgian, Dutch, and French data leads to identical conclusions (results are available upon request). We did not use data for Luxembourg (low number of observations) and Ireland (the confessional cleavage is intermingled with issues of national identity and independence).

position of the party leadership on the anti-clerical (1) vs. pro-clerical (20) policy scale. The strongest confessional cleavage can be observed in Italy, followed by West Germany. Virtually no confessional cleavage can be observed in Great Britain. Finally, Denmark is located somewhere in-between with a quite pro-clerical Liberal Party (14.25) and an only moderately anti-clerical Social Democratic Party (8.67).


We focus on church attendance as our indicator for religiosity. This is a better indicator than religious beliefs "because it ties religiosity to existing institutions instead of more abstract religious concepts and values" (Minkenberg 2002: 237). In addition, church attendance captures the element of social control that is central to our argument. Finally, this operationalization enables us to use the same variable in both datasets and across all countries. We are aware that this indicator tends to bias against Protestant countries, since Protestantism is a more individualized religion and puts stronger emphasis on individual forms of religious practice, like prayers (Haller and Höllinger 1994). Our main reason for using church attendance is data availability and comparability. Church attendance is also better covered in the Eurobarometer surveys with 33 surveys including this question in the trend-file alone (i.e. from 1972-2002), but only 21 surveys asking about the respondents' religiosity. Most importantly in our context, church attendance has figured in an additional five surveys in the 2000s (see appendix below, surveys in 2005, 2006 and 2010), which allows us to study four full decades of changing religious behav-

ior and attitudes, while religiosity or the importance of religion has not been an explicit topic in these more recent surveys. The same reasoning also guides our choice of dependent variables. We use the vote intention variable in our analysis of World Value Survey data. However, in the case of Eurobarometer surveys, data availability speaks in favor of using the left-right self-placement of respondents (77 surveys) as our dependent variable, rather than their vote intention (59 surveys) or their last vote (covered in 31 surveys). Very unfortunately, vote intention has disappeared altogether from Eurobarometer surveys after 2002⁷, the last vote question has been asked only once, in 2008 (EB 69.2), but not in a survey with information on church attendance. However, we arrive at similar conclusions when using vote intention as our dependent variable in the analysis of Eurobarometer surveys (results are available upon request).

Figure 2 (p. 18) displays the share of frequent churchgoers (attending church services once a week or more) by gender for Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and West Germany in the period 1970 to 2010. It shows that religiosity is clearly strongest in Catholic Italy, but even here we see very marked gender differences. Almost 50 % of all Italian women go to church once or several times a week to about a third of all Italian men. This demonstrates that a substantial share of the old gender vote gap in the South European Catholic countries is due to the marked gender differences in religiosity. In the more secu-

⁷ The last Eurobarometer survey containing data on vote intention, church attendance, and control variables is from 1994.

Figure 2: Share of frequent churchgoers (several times or once a week), by country and year, 1970-2010




Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002 [EB 1996 omitted]. 2005: EB63.1, EB63.4, EB64.3; 2006: EB65.2; 2010: EB73.1. Data for 1972, 1974, 1979, 1982-84, 1986-87, 1996-97, 1999-2004, and 2007-2009 linearly imputed.

larized countries Denmark, Great Britain, and West Germany gender differences are less marked, although we find constantly higher church attendance rates among women in these countries, too. In addition, Figure 2 shows that the share of frequent churchgoers has declined in all countries except Denmark, where the share of frequent churchgoers was already below 5 percent in the early 1970s. In Italy the share of frequent churchgoers has declined from more than 50 percent in the early 1970s to less than 30 percent in 2010; in Great Britain and West Germany the share of frequent churchgoers has declined from about 25 percent in the 1970s to about 10 percent in mid-2000s.

In parallel to these decreasing levels of religiosity, we observe a change in the political positions of men and women.

Figure 3 (p. 19) displays the gender vote gap for the four countries in the period 1973 to 2010 using Eurobarometer data. For reasons of data availability, we use the respondents' left/right self-placement, which is a highly significant predictor of respondents' vote intention and party affiliation. The gender vote gap is measured as the difference between the share of women who score themselves as "left" (1 to 3 out of 10) and the share of men who score themselves as "left". Figure 3 shows a clear old gender vote gap in Italy up to the mid-1990s and a clear new gender vote gap in Denmark from the mid-1980s onwards. Gender differences are less pronounced in Great Britain and West Germany. However, a move from a rather old gender vote gap to a new gender vote gap is clearly discernible.

Figure 3: Gender vote gap, by country and year, 1973-2010



Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002; 2003: EB59.1; 2004: EB61; 2005: EB63.4; 2006: EB65.1; 2007: EB67.2; 2008: EB69.2; 2009: EB71.1; 2010: EB73.4. Data for 1974 and 1975 are linearly imputed.

Thus, we can observe a parallel trend in Western democracies: while the gender vote gap has turned from “old” (women vote more conservative than men) to “new” (men vote more conservative than women), the share of highly religious voters has declined in parallel. Not only religiosity has changed in the last four decades, however. Figure 4 (p. 20) shows the average development of the share of respondents living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) and the female dependent employment rates in the period 1975 to 2010. In all four countries, we are observing secular trends towards single households and marital instability (most clearly in Denmark and Great Britain) as well as female labor market participation (most clearly in Italy and West Germany). As in the case of religiosity, these secular


trends run in parallel to the changes in the gender vote gap.

Multivariate analysis

Given these parallel developments presented in the previous section, we now turn to a multivariate analysis of the gender vote gap. In a first step, we analyze World Value Survey data to identify general trends across Western democracies. The advantage of this data is that we can analyze more countries (10) and incorporate more control variables into our regression models. The drawback is that we only have data for the early 1980s, early 1990s and early 2000s.⁸ In a second

⁸ Using the other two available waves would force us to use different countries in the analysis of the different periods.

Figure 4: Respondents living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) and female dependent employment, 1975-2010



Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer trendfile 1970-2002; 2003: EB59.1; 2004: EB61; 2005: EB63.4; 2006: EB65.1; 2007: EB67.2; 2008: EB69.2; 2009: EB71.1; 2010: EB73.4.

step, we use Eurobarometer data for the detailed analysis of the gender vote gap in Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and West Germany. Eurobarometer data have the advantage that we can cover a longer time period (1970 to 2010). However, we are more limited with regard to use of control variables.

In the subsequent analysis of World Value Survey data, we use the intention to vote for left or center-left parties as our dependent variable. Respondents were asked which party they would vote for if national elections were held tomorrow.. We use a dummy variable to distinguish between respondents with the intention to vote for left or center-left parties and respondents with the intention to vote for any other party. We classified parties using Cusack et al.'s (2006) party classification scheme. Our four main independent variables are gender, religiosity, labor market participation, and marital status.

We code respondents as religious if they attend religious services once a week or more. For labor market participation, we code respondents as economically active if they are employed (full-time and part-time), self-employed or looking for work (unemployed). The operationalization of gender is straightforward. Finally, marital status is measured using a dummy variable, which distinguishes between respondents living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) and the remaining respondents. In addition, we add interaction effects between gender and religiosity, gender and labor market participation, and gender and marital status. We use the three interactions to test whether religiosity, labor market participation, and marital status have different effects on women than on men. Finally, we follow the literature in controlling for age, education, income, unemployment, and union membership (De La O and Rodden 2008). See

Table 1a: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of church attendance on left vote

	Women	Men
Early 1980s	-0.059 [-0.102; -0.015]	-0.115 [-0.162; -0.067]
Early 1990s	-0.222 [-0.250; -0.194]	-0.207 [-0.237; -0.177]
Early 2000s	-0.175 [-0.204; -0.145]	-0.143 [-0.177; -0.109]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).

Table 1b: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of dependent employment on left vote

	Women	Men
Early 1980s	0.056 [0.009; 0.104]	-0.020 [-0.070; 0.034]
Early 1990s	0.002 [-0.028; 0.032]	0.019 [-0.013; 0.050]
Early 2000s	0.028 [-0.004; 0.061]	-0.005 [-0.038; 0.027]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).

Table 1c: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of marital status (divorced, separated, single) on left vote

	Women	Men
Early 1980s	0.058 [0.007; 0.108]	0.024 [-0.027; 0.075]
Early 1990s	-0.000 [-0.034; 0.033]	0.009 [-0.023; 0.041]
Early 2000s	0.043 [0.011; 0.076]	0.033 [0.007; 0.065]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).

Table 1d: Predicted values (based on Table A1): Effect of gender on left vote

	Early 1980s	Early 1990s	Early 2000s
Not employed, not living alone, not religious,	-0.064 [-0.119; -0.009]	0.044 [0.011; 0.077]	0.029 [-0.005; 0.063]
Not employed, not living alone, religious,	-0.008 [-0.066; 0.049]	0.029 [-0.007; 0.065]	-0.002 [-0.002; 0.036]
Not employed, living alone, not religious	-0.030 [-0.100; 0.041]	0.034 [-0.012; 0.080]	0.040 [-0.004; 0.083]
Not employed, living, alone, religious	0.025 [-0.051; 0.101]	0.021 [-0.025; 0.067]	0.006 [-0.042; 0.055]
Employed, not living alone, not religious	0.014 [-0.040; 0.067]	0.027 [-0.002; 0.057]	0.064 [0.064; 0.099]
Employed, not living alone, religious	0.063 [0.003; 0.124]	0.015 [-0.023; 0.054]	0.025 [-0.016; 0.067]
Employed, living alone, not religious	0.050 [-0.014; 0.114]	0.017 [-0.024; 0.059]	0.075 [0.036; 0.114]
Employed, living alone, religious	0.100 [0.026; 0.175]	0.007 [-0.040; 0.054]	0.035 [-0.014; 0.085]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects (95% confidence intervals in brackets).

the appendix for a detailed discussion of the operationalization.

We are primarily interested in the interaction effects between gender on the one hand and religiosity, labor market participation, and marital status on the other hand. The interpretation of interaction effects is fundamentally different for non-linear regression models such as logit models compared to linear regression models. For instance, an insignificant estimate of the interaction coefficient does not necessarily indicate an insignificant effect; nor does the sign of the coefficient necessarily denote the correct direction of the effect (Ai and Norton 2003). Consequently, we predict probabilities based on our regression models for all three waves only varying the variables of interest (see Tables 1a to 1d). The regression models are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix.

The findings presented in Tables 1a to

1d can be summarized as follows: First, religiosity has a strong negative effect on the probability to vote for left or center-left parties (see Table 1a). This effect is significant for both men and woman, and for all three waves. No meaningful differences between the genders can be observed.

Second, labor market participation only has a weak effect on left party vote (see Table 1b). Although the coefficient is consistently positive for female respondents, only the coefficient for the first wave (early 1980s) is significantly different from zero. No effect of labor market participation can be observed in the case of male respondents.

Third, living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) has a positive effect on the probability of voting for left and center-left parties (see Table 1c), in particular for female respondents. The coeffi-

cients are positive and significantly different from zero in the early 1980s and the early 2000s for female respondents and in the early 2000s for male respondents.

Fourth, substantively, religiosity is a more powerful predictor of vote choice than labor market participation and marital status. For instance, religiosity decreases the probability of left party choice by between 5.9 to 22.2 percentage points (see Table 1a). In contrast, labor market participation changes the probability of left party choice by maximum 5.6 percentage points (see Table 1b), while marital status changes the probability of left party choice by maximum 5.8 percentage points (see Table 1c).


Finally, when we control for religiosity, marital status, and labor market participation, gender has only a weak effect on left party choice (see Table 1d). Out of eight possible combinations of our dummy variables (2^3) in the three waves of the World Value Survey, we find significant effects of gender in only six cases (out of 24 possible cases). This clearly shows that religiosity, marital status and labor market participation can explain a considerable part of the observed gender vote gap.

In sum, we find some evidence in favor of all three secular trends identified above. Respondents living alone are more likely to vote for left and center-left parties, while religious respondents are less likely to do so. With regard to labor market participation, the evidence is more mixed. Overall, religiosity is clearly the most powerful predictor of left party choice and has a strong and independent effect on vote choice.

In a second step, we now turn to the detailed analysis of our four “prototypical” cases. Above, we argued that we should be able to observe profound cross-national differences because of marked differences in the strength of the confessional cleavage (see Figure 1) and different employment opportunities for female labor market participants. Using Eurobarometer surveys we now follow the developments in these four countries over four decades. We look at the left-right self-placement, a variable which in the Eurobarometer dataset runs from 1 to 10. We have recoded it into one variable capturing whether respondents have placed themselves in the interval 1 to 3 (left) or not. We then look at the covariates for a left self-placement controlling for religiosity, labor market participation, marital status, age, income, and education. Data availability forces us to drop some Eurobarometer surveys from our dataset. Most importantly, only one Eurobarometer survey in the first decade of the 21st century contains all variables needed to estimate these regression models. As a result, the last decade refers to EB 73.1 (2010) only.

Figure 5 (p. 24) shows the effect of controlling for religiosity on the coefficient of the variable “gender”. It displays the coefficients with (dark gray) and without (light gray) control for religiosity for four countries and four decades. In each country and in each decade, controlling for religiosity decreases (increases) the negative (positive) of gender on left party choice. Thus, in all four countries and in all four decades, religiosity contributes to the old gender vote gap (or inhibits the new gender vote gap from becoming vis-

Figure 5: Effect of gender on left self-placement in four decades, with control for religiosity (dark gray bars) and without control for religiosity (light gray bars)



Note: Logistic regressions with the dependent variable left self-placement. The figures show the coefficient of the variable gender. The following control variables have been used: age, education, and income (socio-economic level in the model using data from 2010). Dark gray bars display the coefficient in models controlling for religiosity (measured with church attendance, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (several times a week)), light gray bars display the coefficient in models not controlling for religiosity. Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 [2010].

ible). Figure 5 further shows that in Denmark the new gender vote gap emerged already in the 1980s, while in Italy we are still observing a weak old gender vote gap. For West Germany, the old gender vote gap virtually disappeared in the 1990s before it reappeared in 2010. We speculate that this is a “Chancellor effect”. Given that Christian Democrat Angela Merkel is the first female Chancellor, it is likely that she is able to attract a large share of the female vote.

In a next step, we estimate logistic regressions of left self-placement on the

dummy variables for gender, religiosity, labor market participation, marital status, and control variables (see Tables A2 to A5 in the Appendix). As in the case of the World Value Survey data, interaction effects in non-linear regression models are best analyzed using predicted probabilities. Table 2a displays the effect of religiosity, Table 2b the effect of labor market participation, Table 2c the effect of marital status (divorced, separated, without partner), and Table 2d displays the effect of gender on left self-placement.

The findings presented in Tables 2a

to 2d (p. 27-31) can be summarized as follows: First, religiosity has a negative and substantially important effect on left self-placement in Italy and West Germany (see Table 2a). The effect of religiosity is weaker in Denmark and Great Britain. The weak effect of religiosity on left self-placement in Great Britain is consistent with the absence of a strong confessional cleavage (see Figure 1), while the weak effect of religiosity in Denmark is likely to be the result of the low number of religious respondents (see Figure 2).⁹

Second, as Table 2b shows, labor market participation is a weaker predictor of left self-placement than religiosity. Among women, labor market participation significantly increases the probability of left self-placement in West Germany in the 1980s and 2010, in Italy in the 1980s and 1990s, and Denmark in the 1990s. In contrast, labor market participation does not affect the probability of left self-placement in Great Britain. Among men, labor market participation significantly increases the probability of left self-placement in West Germany in the 1980s, in Italy in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, in Denmark in 2010, and in Great Britain in the 1970s. This analogy between male and female voting behavior has noteworthy implications. Since labor market participation has similar effects on the probability of left self-placement for men and women, it cannot be ruled out that the effect of labor market participation on left self-place-

ment is the result of the pro-labor stance of left and center-left parties (expected to affect both genders) rather than their programmatic focus on reconciliation of work and family life and their support for public sector jobs (expected to mostly affect women).

Third, marital status has only a weak effect on the probability of left self-placement (see Table 2c). Among women, we only observe a significant positive effect of living alone (divorced, separated, without partner) in Denmark in the 1980s, and a significant negative effect in West Germany in 2010. Among men, we observe significant positive effects in West Germany in the 1970s and in Italy in the 1970s, and a significant negative effect in Italy in the 1980s. Overall, marital status has a significant positive effect on left self-placement in only 3 of 32 cases. In accordance with our theoretical expectations, marital status has no effect on the probability of left self-placement in Great Britain, which we argue took a “private” route to high female employment in the service sector.

Finally, when controlling for religiosity, marital status, and labor market participation, gender has only a weak effect on left self-placement (see Table 2d). Of the 128 logically possible combinations of the four countries, four decades, and eight combinations of the three dummy variables for religiosity, marital status, and labor market participation we are analyzing, the coefficient of the variable “gender” turns out to be significantly different from zero in only 18 cases (14.1 percent; in 12 cases, the coefficient is negative; in six cases, the coefficient is positive). In-

⁹ Using the original ordinal scale indicator of religiosity (ranging from 1 to 5) instead of the dummy variable leads to significant effects in Denmark, but not in Great Britain (results are available upon request).

terestingly, it seems as if the regression models for the 1970s fail to fully explain the old gender vote gap (seven significant effects of gender in the 1970s compared to eleven significant effects of gender in the other three periods combined).

We can draw two main conclusions on the basis of the above analysis of Eurobarometer data. First, the observed gender vote gap, both the “old” and the “new” one, largely disappears once control variables for religiosity, labor market participation, and marital status are introduced. Thus, these three factors largely explain the existence of the gender vote gap. Second, among the three factors, religiosity has by far the largest substantive effect. Except in Great Britain where there is no confessional cleavage to speak of (see Figure 1) and to a certain extent Denmark (few religious voters), religiosity is a powerful predictor of left self-placement. In contrast, labor market participation and marital status are only occasionally significant predictors of left self-placement.

Table 2a: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of church attendance on left self-placement

WEST GERMANY	Women	Men
1970s	-0.022 [-0.045; 0.000]	-0.081 [-0.109; -0.053]
1980s	-0.063 [-0.093; -0.033]	-0.071 [-0.109; -0.032]
1990s	-0.049 [-0.073; -0.025]	-0.056 [-0.086; -0.027]
2010	0.062 [-0.459; 0.584]	-0.180 [-0.368; 0.008]

ITALY	Women	Men
1970s	-0.283 [-0.322; -0.243]	-0.263 [-0.303; -0.222]
1980s	-0.215 [-0.251; -0.179]	-0.270 [-0.306; -0.233]
1990s	-0.148 [-0.179; -0.117]	-0.192 [-0.225; -0.158]
2010	-0.200 [-0.303; -0.096]	-0.159 [-0.437; 0.120]

DENMARK	Women	Men
1970s	-0.026 [-0.088; 0.037]	-0.060 [-0.078; 0.066]
1980s	-0.023 [-0.072; 0.027]	-0.010 [-0.072; 0.053]
1990s	-0.028 [-0.076; 0.021]	-0.060 [-0.103; -0.017]
2010	-0.163 [-0.205; -0.121]	-0.169 [-0.252; -0.085]

GREAT BRITAIN	Women	Men
1970s	-0.017 [-0.051; 0.018]	-0.005 [-0.044; 0.034]
1980s	0.007 [-0.028; 0.043]	-0.030 [-0.072; 0.011]
1990s	-0.004 [-0.032; 0.023]	-0.020 [-0.054; 0.015]
2010	-0.159 [-0.256; -0.062]	-0.119 [-0.208; -0.029]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects [95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010].

Table 2b: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of dependent employment on left self-placement

WEST GERMANY	Women	Men
1970s	0.019 [-0.007; 0.045]	0.006 [-0.023; 0.035]
1980s	0.037 [0.006; 0.068]	0.039 [0.006; 0.072]
1990s	0.002 [-0.022; 0.025]	0.008 [-0.026; 0.027]
2010	0.062 [0.002; 0.121]	-0.043 [-0.118; 0.031]

ITALY	Women	Men
1970s	0.029 [-0.024; 0.083]	0.100 [0.058; 0.142]
1980s	0.057 [0.010; 0.105]	0.081 [0.041; 0.121]
1990s	0.086 [0.047; 0.125]	0.043 [0.009; 0.078]
2010	-0.003 [-0.089; 0.083]	-0.040 [-0.123; 0.044]

DENMARK	Women	Men
1970s	0.008 [-0.017; 0.034]	0.029 [-0.000; 0.059]
1980s	0.020 [-0.007; 0.047]	0.020 [-0.010; 0.050]
1990s	0.036 [0.010; 0.061]	0.017 [-0.007; 0.040]
2010	0.049 [-0.011; 0.109]	0.069 [0.001; 0.137]

GREAT BRITAIN	Women	Men
1970s	0.015 [-0.016; 0.047]	0.043 [0.008; 0.078]
1980s	0.007 [-0.023; 0.037]	0.022 [-0.017; 0.060]
1990s	-0.006 [-0.031; 0.020]	-0.005 [-0.036; 0.026]
2010	0.019 [-0.067; 0.105]	0.017 [-0.053; 0.086]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects [95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010].

Table 2c: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of marital status (divorced, separated, single) on left self-placement

WEST GERMANY	Women	Men
1970s	0.009 [-0.020; 0.009]	0.060 [0.016; 0.104]
1980s	0.024 [-0.012; 0.060]	0.031 [-0.007; 0.068]
1990s	0.015 [-0.013; 0.043]	-0.016 [-0.042; 0.010]
2010	-0.048 [-0.090; -0.006]	0.005 [-0.085; 0.096]

ITALY	Women	Men
1970s	0.024 [-0.033; 0.080]	0.081 [0.027; 0.135]
1980s	-0.031 [-0.076; 0.014]	-0.068 [-0.112; -0.025]
1990s	0.016 [-0.023; 0.055]	-0.030 [-0.070; 0.011]
2010	-0.012 [-0.106; 0.082]	-0.073 [-0.164; 0.018]

DENMARK	Women	Men
1970s	0.036 [-0.007; 0.079]	-0.004 [-0.037; 0.028]
1980s	0.060 [0.021; 0.099]	-0.026 [-0.055; 0.004]
1990s	0.027 [-0.003; 0.058]	0.027 [-0.003; 0.058]
2010	0.131 [0.048; 0.214]	-0.067 [-0.121; -0.013]

GREAT BRITAIN	Women	Men
1970s	-0.014 [-0.057; 0.029]	0.004 [-0.044; 0.037]
1980s	0.003 [-0.034; 0.040]	0.020 [-0.025; 0.065]
1990s	-0.006 [-0.035; 0.023]	-0.004 [-0.039; 0.031]
2010	-0.051 [-0.131; 0.028]	0.034 [-0.048; 0.115]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects [95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and 90% confidence intervals for 2010].

Table 2d: Predicted probabilities (based on Tables A2 to A5): Effect of gender on left self-placement

WEST GERMANY	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Not employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.043 [-0.074; -0.012]	-0.023 [-0.057; 0.010]	-0.019 [-0.047; 0.009]	-0.116 [-0.185; -0.048]
Not employed, not living alone, religious	0.010 [-0.015; 0.035]	-0.016 [-0.053; 0.020]	-0.012 [-0.045; 0.022]	0.126 [-0.414; 0.667]
Not employed, living alone, not religious	-0.098 [-0.158; -0.039]	-0.030 [-0.083; 0.023]	0.015 [-0.026; 0.056]	-0.167 [-0.261; -0.074]
Not employed, living alone, religious	-0.008 [-0.051; 0.036]	-0.021 [-0.072; 0.029]	0.011 [-0.030; 0.051]	0.056 [-0.927; 0.440]
Employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.028 [-0.062; 0.007]	-0.026 [-0.064; 0.013]	-0.018 [-0.045; 0.009]	-0.005 [-0.079; 0.068]
Employed, not living alone, religious	0.023 [-0.010; 0.056]	-0.019 [-0.067; 0.029]	-0.011 [-0.047; 0.025]	0.229 [-0.496; 0.954]
Employed, living alone, not religious	-0.083 [-0.144; -0.023]	-0.033 [-0.084; 0.018]	0.016 [-0.017; 0.048]	-0.080 [-0.166; 0.006]
Employed, living alone, religious	0.071 [0.035; 0.107]	-0.025 [-0.087; 0.037]	0.012 [-0.028; 0.051]	0.130 [-0.404; 0.663]

ITALY	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Not employed, not living alone, not religious	0.014 [-0.037; 0.064]	-0.056 [-0.105; 0.008]	-0.068 [-0.110; -0.026]	-0.043 [-0.412; 0.056]
Not employed, not living alone, religious	-0.005 [-0.043; 0.033]	-0.002 [-0.035; 0.031]	-0.025 [-0.055; 0.005]	-0.090 [-0.3729; 0.193]
Not employed, living alone, not religious	-0.049 [-0.132; 0.034]	-0.013 [-0.082; 0.056]	-0.016 [-0.079; 0.048]	0.023 [-0.119; 0.165]
Not employed, living alone, religious	-0.040 [-0.098; 0.017]	0.014 [-0.022; 0.051]	0.004 [-0.037; 0.045]	-0.054 [-0.268; 0.161]
Employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.065 [-0.133; 0.004]	-0.079 [-0.146; -0.012]	-0.014 [-0.069; 0.040]	-0.003 [-0.102; 0.095]
Employed, not living alone, religious	-0.051 [-0.104; 0.003]	-0.013 [-0.064; 0.037]	0.008 [-0.037; 0.052]	-0.069 [-0.315; 0.177]
Employed, living alone, not religious	-0.129 [-0.210; -0.049]	-0.032 [-0.109; 0.044]	0.044 [-0.024; 0.111]	0.054 [-0.064; 0.172]
Employed, living alone, religious	-0.100 [-0.170; -0.031]	0.010 [-0.038; 0.059]	0.044 [-0.008; 0.097]	-0.039 [-0.224; 0.146]

DENMARK	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Not employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.008 [-0.036; 0.020]	-0.005 [-0.034; 0.024]	0.016 [-0.008; 0.040]	-0.012 [-0.074; 0.050]
Not employed, not living alone, religious	-0.025 [-0.107; 0.057]	-0.016 [-0.079; 0.046]	0.043 [-0.011; 0.097]	-0.006 [-0.062; 0.049]
Not employed, living alone, not religious	0.029 [-0.021; 0.079]	0.073 [0.025; 0.120]	0.016 [-0.023; 0.055]	0.166 [0.070; 0.262]
Not employed, living alone, religious	0.002 [-0.100; 0.104]	0.048 [-0.029; 0.125]	0.051 [-0.017; 0.119]	-0.004 [-0.035; 0.028]
Employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.029 [-0.055; -0.003]	-0.005 [-0.030; 0.019]	0.035 [0.013; 0.057]	-0.032 [-0.104; 0.040]
Employed, not living alone, religious	-0.047 [-0.150; 0.056]	-0.019 [-0.096; 0.058]	0.064 [-0.004; 0.131]	-0.010 [-0.100; 0.079]
Employed, living alone, not religious	0.013 [-0.040; 0.066]	0.087 [0.040; 0.135]	0.037 [-0.005; 0.079]	0.198 [0.094; 0.302]
Employed, living alone, religious	-0.016 [-0.140; 0.108]	0.058 [-0.037; 0.153]	0.075 [-0.009; 0.159]	-0.006 [-0.056; 0.045]

GREAT BRITAIN	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Not employed, not living alone, not religious	0.012 [-0.021; 0.045]	-0.026 [-0.060; 0.008]	-0.017 [-0.045; 0.012]	0.041 [-0.039; 0.121]
Not employed, not living alone, religious	0.002 [-0.044; 0.048]	0.009 [-0.039; 0.058]	-0.001 [-0.044; 0.042]	0.002 [-0.092; 0.096]
Not employed, living alone, not religious	0.003 [-0.051; 0.056]	-0.043 [-0.099; 0.013]	-0.018 [-0.063; 0.027]	-0.044 [-0.152; 0.064]
Not employed, living, alone, religious	-0.006 [-0.063; 0.051]	-0.003 [-0.071; 0.064]	-0.003 [-0.056; 0.050]	-0.008 [-0.105; 0.090]
Employed, not living alone, not religious	-0.017 [-0.054; 0.021]	-0.040 [-0.078; -0.003]	-0.017 [-0.047; 0.013]	0.043 [-0.045; 0.131]
Employed, not living alone, religious	-0.027 [-0.087; 0.034]	-0.000 [-0.057; 0.057]	-0.002 [-0.046; 0.042]	0.002 [-0.106; 0.110]
Employed, living alone, not religious	-0.026 [-0.091; 0.039]	-0.060 [-0.118; -0.001]	-0.019 [-0.061; 0.024]	-0.051 [-0.169; 0.068]
Employed, living alone, religious	-0.035 [-0.109; 0.040]	-0.015 [-0.089; 0.059]	-0.004 [-0.055; 0.048]	-0.009 [-0.122; 0.105]

Note: Shaded cells indicate significant effects [95% confidence intervals in brackets for the 1970s,

Conclusions

In the preceding analyses we found religiosity to be a powerful independent predictor of the political preferences and vote choice, in particular in countries characterized by a strong confessional cleavage. Religiosity proved to be a very strong, in fact a much stronger predictor than any of the other socio-economic variables we tested and it is not at all absorbed by these other variables. We also found the old (new) gender vote gap to be much weaker (stronger) once we control for religiosity. In fact, controlling for employment and marital status plus religiosity made gender differences in political preferences largely disappear. Our most important finding therefore is that the impact of religion on vote choice/ political preferences is quite independent from its impact on a country's gendered political economy. The "political economy explanations of redistributive politics" (Cusack et al. 2006: 366) are clearly in need of a party-political complement.

Our findings speak to a puzzle of the comparative welfare state literature: How was the "women-unfriendly" welfare state of Continental and Southern Europe electorally sustainable? Why did female voters not abandon the parties defending these "women-unfriendly" welfare states and switch allegiance to parties promoting more "women-friendly" policies? We have pointed to one possible explanation: religious voting. But in contrast to the previous literature we do not claim (but we also do not dispute) that the impact of religion on the welfare state went

via a traditional (Catholic) value system, which assigned the role of house-keeping and child-rearing to women and hindered their full labor market integration.

Instead, we have highlighted the importance of political cleavage lines, as they have become manifest in European party systems. In countries with a strong confessional (pro-clerical/anti-clerical) cleavage line, we argue, inter-party competition over the religious voters was distorted, since religious voters simply could not vote for parties that took an often aggressive anti-clerical stance. A very traditional gender division of labor might be the consequence of the strong role that the parties of religious defense have played in the countries with such a political cleavage line. Taking the (over-proportionately female) religious vote for granted, Christian democratic parties did not have to worry about "women-friendly" welfare policies. Only when the confessional cleavage started to lose its saliency and the share of religious voters started to decline did Christian democratic parties have to adapt their political program to accommodate the socio-economic preferences of female voters.

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Appendix

Table A1: Left vote, logistic regression (World Value Survey aggregated file, waves 1, 2 and 4)

	Early 1980s	Early 1990s	Early 2000s
Gender (woman = 1)	-0.264** (0.023)	0.176*** (0.009)	0.121* (0.095)
Dependent employment	-0.082 (0.436)	0.077 (0.241)	-0.024 (0.742)
Gender x dependent employment	0.320** (0.014)	-0.067 (0.395)	0.142* (0.099)
Church attendance	-0.479*** (0.000)	-0.890*** (0.000)	-0.651*** (0.000)
Gender x church attendance	0.226* (0.096)	-0.036 (0.692)	-0.131 (0.221)
Marital status (single, divorced, separated = 1)	0.099 (0.351)	0.037 (0.574)	0.141** (0.044)
Gender x marital status	0.144 (0.302)	-0.039 (0.661)	0.041 (0.652)
Age (15-24)	-0.216** (0.037)	0.039 (0.592)	-0.050 (0.551)
Age (35-44)	-0.093 (0.387)	-0.050 (0.389)	0.008 (0.905)
Age (45-54)	-0.183 (0.108)	-0.329*** (0.000)	0.110 (0.127)
Age (55-64)	-0.205* (0.080)	-0.399*** (0.000)	-0.032 (0.698)
Age (65+)	-0.138 (0.269)	-0.545*** (0.000)	-0.165* (0.056)
Low education	0.230** (0.012)	0.119** (0.016)	0.130** (0.027)
High education	-0.098 (0.197)	0.038 (0.466)	0.169*** (0.002)
Income	-0.089*** (0.000)	-0.099*** (0.000)	-0.044*** (0.000)
Union membership	0.826*** (0.000)	0.571*** (0.000)	0.398*** (0.000)
Unemployed	0.126 (0.399)	0.287*** (0.004)	0.020 (0.825)
Constant	0.587*** (0.000)	0.862*** (0.000)	0.439*** (0.000)
Pseudo R ²	0.093	0.085	0.063
Observations	4'749	12'685	10'382

Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; country fixed effects omitted from table.

Table A2: Determinants of left self-placement: West Germany (Eurobarometer)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Gender (woman = 1)	-0.538*** (0.004)	-0.203 (0.165)	-0.155 (0.174)	-0.868*** (0.005)
Church attendance	-1.171*** (0.000)	-0.614*** (0.002)	-0.526*** (0.001)	-0.365 (0.471)
Gender x church attendance	0.795** (0.017)	-0.034 (0.898)	0.013 (0.951)	0.471 (0.488)
Dependent employment	0.060 (0.715)	0.300** (0.026)	0.006 (0.956)	-0.283 (0.339)
Gender x dependent employment	0.236 (0.333)	0.022 (0.901)	0.008 (0.958)	0.831** (0.038)
Marital status (single, divorced, separated)	0.540*** (0.003)	0.225* (0.095)	-0.143 (0.226)	0.030 (0.922)
Gender x marital status	-0.397 (0.163)	-0.022 (0.908)	0.275* (0.083)	-0.624 (0.175)
Age	-0.012 (0.777)	-0.046 (0.159)	-0.138*** (0.000)	-0.185** (0.018)
Income (socio-economic level)	-0.007 (0.722)	-0.044*** (0.003)	-0.029** (0.013)	-0.270*** (0.001)
Education	0.005 (0.368)	0.015 (0.223)	-0.000 (0.927)	0.084*** (0.000)
Constant	-2.018*** (0.000)	-1.342*** (0.000)	-0.984*** (0.000)	-0.541 (0.423)
Pseudo R ²	0.029	0.023	0.015	0.058
Observations	4011	4638	7613	816

Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 (2010).

Table A3: Determinants of left self-placement: Italy (Eurobarometer)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Gender (woman = 1)	0.058 (0.596)	-0.244** (0.024)	-0.326*** (0.002)	-0.219 (0.473)
Church attendance	-1.365*** (0.000)	-1.484*** (0.000)	-1.032*** (0.000)	-0.218 (0.506)
Gender x church attendance	-0.102 (0.558)	0.225 (0.175)	0.113 (0.420)	-0.246 (0.587)
Dependent employment	0.460*** (0.000)	0.388*** (0.000)	0.225** (0.014)	-0.219 (0.431)
Gender x dependent employment	-0.320** (0.043)	-0.076 (0.623)	0.265** (0.048)	0.201 (0.607)
Marital status (single, divorced, separated)	0.367*** (0.003)	-0.355*** (0.003)	-0.158 (0.158)	-0.424 (0.219)
Gender x marital status	-0.257 (0.134)	0.182 (0.284)	0.250 (0.105)	0.353 (0.465)
Age	-0.058** (0.035)	-0.001 (0.963)	0.043* (0.081)	-0.157** (0.039)
Income (socio-economic level)	-0.057*** (0.004)	-0.050*** (0.000)	-0.036*** (0.001)	-0.155** (0.033)
Education	-0.032** (0.021)	-0.005 (0.715)	-0.014 (0.200)	0.018 (0.419)
Constant	0.068 (0.718)	-0.125 (0.463)	-0.605*** (0.000)	0.305 (0.652)
Pseudo R ²	0.087	0.075	0.045	0.020
Observations	4063	4478	5637	633

Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 [2010].

Table A4: Determinants of left self-placement: Denmark (Eurobarometer)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Gender (woman = 1)	-0.119 (0.567)	-0.065 (0.727)	0.172 (0.203)	-0.097 (0.756)
Church attendance	-0.075 (0.875)	-0.114 (0.764)	-0.824* (0.052)	-0.655 (0.537)
Gender x church attendance	-0.336 (0.661)	-0.180 (0.707)	0.557 (0.264)	-1.165 (0.433)
Dependent employment	0.349* (0.061)	0.222 (0.207)	0.176 (0.173)	0.485* (0.095)
Gender x dependent employment	-0.228 (0.357)	0.008 (0.969)	0.139 (0.373)	-0.102 (0.787)
Marital status (single, divorced, separated)	-0.057 (0.790)	-0.326 (0.113)	0.261* (0.064)	-0.585* (0.059)
Gender x marital status	0.481 (0.109)	0.890*** (0.000)	-0.030 (0.864)	1.367*** (0.001)
Age	-0.311*** (0.000)	-0.250*** (0.000)	-0.129*** (0.000)	-0.060 (0.427)
Income (socio-economic level)	-0.036 (0.231)	-0.031 (0.152)	-0.025* (0.077)	-0.028 (0.681)
Education	0.009 (0.485)	0.055*** (0.003)	0.001 (0.714)	0.007 (0.562)
Constant	-1.117*** (0.001)	-1.479*** (0.000)	-1.597*** (0.000)	-1.489** (0.012)
Pseudo R ²	0.041	0.042	0.017	0.036
Observations	3518	3888	6933	872

Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 [2010].

Table A5: Determinants of left self-placement: Great Britain (Eurobarometer)

	1970s	1980s	1990s	2010
Gender (woman = 1)	0.161 (0.492)	-0.269 (0.124)	-0.155 (0.251)	0.326 (0.403)
Church attendance	-0.060 (0.816)	-0.299 (0.178)	-0.191 (0.281)	-0.481 (0.453)
Gender x church attendance	-0.133 (0.692)	0.375 (0.192)	0.146 (0.523)	-0.039 (0.964)
Dependent employment	0.513** (0.027)	0.187 (0.277)	-0.047 (0.745)	0.152 (0.691)
Gender x dependent employment	-0.329 (0.247)	-0.108 (0.633)	-0.011 (0.953)	-0.014 (0.978)
Marital status (single, divorced, separated)	-0.047 (0.861)	0.168 (0.367)	-0.039 (0.814)	0.274 (0.480)
Gender x marital status	-0.121 (0.747)	-0.139 (0.603)	-0.022 (0.920)	-0.700 (0.223)
Age	-0.086* (0.072)	-0.106*** (0.008)	-0.152*** (0.000)	-0.048 (0.589)
Income (socio-economic level)	-0.151*** (0.000)	-0.107*** (0.000)	-0.083*** (0.000)	-0.115 (0.153)
Education	-0.012 (0.493)	0.013 (0.652)	-0.001 (0.966)	0.066** (0.022)
Constant	-1.130*** (0.005)	-0.873*** (0.002)	-0.648*** (0.004)	-2.235** (0.011)
Pseudo R ²	0.015	0.018	0.014	0.032
Observations	2799	3288	4952	534

Notes: p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Source: Eurobarometer trendfile and EB73.1 [2010].

Data description:

In this analysis we have used the following data sets:

World Value Survey four-wave integrated data file

The file can be downloaded from the following website: <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/>

Bibliographic citation: European and World Values Surveys four-wave integrated data file, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. Surveys designed and executed by the European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association. File Producers: ASEP/JDS, Madrid, Spain and Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands. File Distributors: ASEP/JDS and GESIS, Cologne, Germany.

We use data from wave 1 (early 1980s), wave 2 (early 1990s), and wave 3 (early 2000s) for the following ten countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United States of America.

Operationalization:

Left vote (variable e179): If there were a national election tomorrow, for which party on this list would you vote? The dummy variable has been created by distinguishing between respondents with the intention to vote for center-left and left parties and respondents with the intention to vote for any other party.

Parties have been classified using the party classification scheme by Cusack et al. (2006).

Gender (x001): Respondents answering female have been coded as one.

Church attendance (f028): How often do you attend religious services? The dummy variable has been created by distinguishing between respondents attending religious service once a week or more often and respondents attending religious less than once a week.

Labor market participation (x028): Are you employed now or not? Respondents are coded as economically active if they are employed (full-time or part-time), self-employed or unemployed.

Divorced, separated, or without partner (x007): Are you currently ... (3) divorced, (4) separated, or (6) single/never married? This dummy variable distinguishes between respondents who are divorced, separated, or without partner and the remaining respondents (excluding the missing observations).

Age (x003): The age of the respondent at the time of the survey. Respondents below the age of 18 have been excluded from the survey. We incorporate age in the form of dummy variables into the regression model. The six dummy variables capture respondents aged 18 to 24, aged 25 to 34, aged 35 to 44, aged 45 to 54, aged 55 to 64, and aged 65 or older (variable x003r). We use the group aged 25 to 34 as reference category.

Education (x025): The variables 'low education' and 'high education' (reference category 'middle education') have been coded using the following survey question: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? We use the recoded education variable provided by the survey (x025r), which distinguishes between 'low education', 'middle

education', and 'high education'. We use 'middle education' as reference category.

Income (x047): The income variable is provided by the survey and distinguishes between ten steps.

Union membership (a067): Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say, which, if any, do you belong to? Labour unions.

Unemployed (x028): This dummy variable distinguishes between unemployed respondents and the remaining respondents (excluding missing observations).

The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-2002. Data Set Edition 2.00. 2003: Eurobarometer 59.1; 2004: Eurobarometer 61; 2005: Eurobarometer 63.1, Eurobarometer 63.4, Eurobarometer 64.3; 2006: Eurobarometer 65.1, Eurobarometer 65.2; 2007: Eurobarometer 67.2; 2008: Eurobarometer 69.2; 2009: Eurobarometer 71.1; 2010: Eurobarometer 73.1, Eurobarometer 73.4.

All these files can be downloaded from the following website: <http://www.gesis.org>

EB63.1, EB63.4, EB64.3, and EB65.2 contain a variable capturing church attendance, but no variable capturing income or the socio-economic status. Therefore, for the multivariate analysis only the Trend File and EB73.1 have been used (in the latter case using socio-economic status as a proxy for income).

We use data for the following seven countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, and West Germany,

Operationalization Eurobarometer Trend File:

Left self-placement (variable lrs): In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale? The variable runs from 1 to 10. We have recoded this variable into a dummy variable capturing whether the respondent has placed him- or herself in the interval 1 to 3 (left) or not.

Gender (sex): Respondents answering female have been coded as one.

Church attendance (churchat): Do you go to religious services several times a week, once a week, a few times in the year or never? The dummy variable has been created by distinguishing between respondents attending religious service once a week or more often and respondents attending religious less than once a week.

Labor market participation (occup): What is your occupation? This dummy variable captures whether the respondent is in dependent employment (1) or not (0) (excluding missing observations).

Divorced, separated, or without partner (married): Are you single, married, living as married, divorced, separated or widowed? This dummy variable distinguishes between respondents who are single, divorced, or separated and the remaining respondents (excluding the missing observations).

Age (age): Could you tell me your date of birth please? We have subsequently recoded this variable into six categories: respondents younger than 25, respondents aged 25 to 34, respondents aged 35 to 44, respondents aged 45 to 54, respondents aged 55 to 64, and respondents aged 65 or older.

Income (income): This variable is provided by the survey and distinguishes

between 13 categories. High values indicate high earnings.

Education (educ): How old were you when you finished your full-time education? Respondents still studying have been dropped from the data set.

Operationalization EB73.1:

Left self-placement (variable D1): In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale? The variable runs from 1 to 10. We have recoded this variable into a dummy variable capturing whether the respondent has placed him- or herself in the interval 1 to 3 (left) or not.

Gender (D10): Respondents answering female have been coded as one.

Church attendance (QB34): Apart from weddings or funerals, about how often do you attend religious services? This variable distinguishes between eight different levels of religiosity. The dummy variable for church attendance has been created by distinguishing between respondents attending religious service once a week or more often and respondents attending religious less than once a week.


Labor market participation (D15AR): What is your occupation? This dummy variable captures whether the respondent is in dependent employment (1) or not (0) (excluding missing observations).

Divorced, separated, or without partner (D7B): Could you give me the letter which corresponds best to your current situation? This dummy variable distinguishes between respondents who are divorced, separated, or single and the remaining respondents (excluding the missing observations).

Age (D11R2): How old are you? We have subsequently recoded this variable into six categories: respondents younger than 25, respondents aged 25 to 34, respondents aged 35 to 44, respondents aged 45 to 54, respondents aged 55 to 64, and respondents aged 65 or older.

Socio-economic level (D61): On the following scale, step '1' corresponds to 'the lowest level in the society', step '10' corresponds to 'the highest level in the society'. Could you tell me on which step you would place yourself? EB73.1 (2010) does not contain a variable 'income'. However, an analysis of Eurobarometer Trend File data shows that income is a very powerful predictor of socio-economic level. We therefore use this variable as proxy variable for income.

Education (VD8): How old were you when you stopped your full-time education? Respondents still studying have been dropped from the data set.



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Top Down or Bottom Up? A Cross-National Study of Vertical Occupational Sex Segregation in Twelve European Countries

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Starting with a comparative assessment of different welfare regimes and political economies from the perspective of gender awareness and “pro-women” policies, this paper identifies the determinants of cross-national variation in women’s chances of being in

a high-status occupation in twelve West European countries. Special emphasis is given to size and structure of the service sector, including share of women in public employment and structural factors such as trade union density and employment protection. The first level of comparison between men and women concentrates on gender representation in the higher echelons of the job hierarchy, while in the second section we extend the scope of analysis, comparing women in high-status occupations and low-wage employment in order to allow for a more nuanced study of gender and class interaction. The first analysis is based on European Social Survey data for the years 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2008, capturing recent trends in occupational dynamics. Results indicate that in general a large service sector and a high trade union density enhance women’s chances of being in a high-status occupations while more specifically a large public sector helps to reduce channeling women in low-wage employment. Thus, equality at the top can well be paired with inequality at the bottom, as postindustrial countries with a highly polarized occupational hierarchy such as the UK show.

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